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1. Introduction 
 
A large share of the immigrant community in the European Union does not have the 
citizenship of the country they have settled in. This exclusion can have negative 
consequences for long-term social cohesion and the legitimacy and representativeness 
of liberal democracies. Many immigrants are not able to vote in national or regional 
elections; they may face indirect disadvantages on the labour market or in the education 
system; they may not develop a sense of belonging in the country of residence without 
the recognition that they are full and equal members of the national community. These 
consequences prompt the question of why immigrants naturalise, or more importantly, 
why they don’t. The project ‘Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant 
Integration’ (ACIT)1 co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country-
Nationals (TCN) provides a new evidence base for comparing different elements of access to 
citizenship in Europe. Four sets of new citizenship indicators measure citizenship across the 
European Union and identify trends and common challenges in the area of law, implementation, 
acquisition and the link between citizenship and integration. This information is crucial to 
identify legal and procedural obstacles for naturalisation. Additional reasons may keep 
immigrants from naturalising, beyond the legal and procedural requirements. 
National roundtables with key stakeholders complement the quantitative results from ACIT 
citizenship indicators. National roundtables were organised in ten EU countries (Austria, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom), 
hosting a total of 133 stakeholders, consisting of academic experts, citizenship lawyers, civil 
servants, politicians and representatives from non-governmental organisations. Participants 
discussed some of the key issues surrounding the acquisition of citizenship in their respective 
country: Which factors influence why immigrants become citizens? Which legal and procedural 
obstacles do they face? How does citizenship affect the integration into society? What is the 
public discourse on the issue of citizenship? What is the political context for citizenship reform 
and who are the relevant drivers?  
The national roundtables were a key element of the ACIT research project. National 
stakeholders had the opportunity to discuss the relevance of indicator results in their national 
context. The indicator results generated fruitful debates among national stakeholders, 
demonstrating the importance and value of using this information to improve policies and 
practices. National roundtables put indicators into practice and reveal perspectives within the 
citizenship debate that would otherwise remain hidden. These include the personal motivations 
of different immigrant groups to naturalise, the societal context in the form of public opinion 
and discourse as well as the question of how party politics affects citizenship reform. Some of 
these questions are difficult to capture with the results of the ACIT indicators. Yet these difficult-
to-measure dimensions are indispensable for understanding the acquisition of citizenship. Key 
                                                          
1
 See the annex for more information about the ACIT project. All the indicators are accessible through an interactive online 
tool and comparative reports on the EUDO CITIZENSHIP observatory.  For more information on the background and 
methodology see appendix and visit http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators. For more information about the situation in 
each selected EU country please see the National Handbooks available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators. 
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stakeholders in EU countries are best suited to tell the story that lies behind the numbers on 
citizenship. 
Citizenship is fundamentally a national debate. Citizenship laws and procedures as well as the 
political context and public discourse differ greatly across Europe. The ACIT citizenship 
indicators compare countries’ citizenship regimes and indicate trends across Europe. Indeed, 
this report finds that many challenges are similar across very different countries. This report 
investigated the similarities and differences in the citizenship debates and perceived challenges 
facing policy makers, academics and NGOs in the EU.  
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2. Executive Summary 
 
National roundtables put indicators into practice. National experts and stakeholders can review 
the accuracy, judge the relevance and interpret the meaning of the indicators at the national 
level. They can prioritise results according to current debates. Most importantly, the national 
roundtables can also provide insights into key questions which cannot be captured by the 
indicators: Why do immigrants naturalise? How does public opinion influence citizenship 
acquisition? What is the political context for citizenship reform and who are the main drivers?  
 
National stakeholders generally welcomed the opportunity for discussion, particularly because 
such occasions rarely involve stakeholders from such a variety of different sectors such as 
politics, civil service, civil society and academia. Several countries had difficulties attracting 
politicians especially from conservative parties. The attendance depended to some degree on 
political priorities, the type of inviting organisation and on current affairs (e.g. elections, 
financial crisis, or parallel events). Rather than repeating the specific results from each chapter, 
this section aims to outline some notable observations across national roundtables on 
citizenship: 
The debate on citizenship policies predominantly focuses on practical incentives for 
naturalisation and on citizenship laws. This focus underestimates the relevance of emotional 
reasons for becoming a citizen and the influence of public opinion and discourse. This emphasis 
may be based on an ‘expert bias’. Stakeholders deal with citizenship at a different level of 
abstraction compared to immigrants who are applying for naturalisation. Analyses of emotional 
reasons for naturalisation as well as public opinion and debate widen the scope of inquiry. They 
could highlight the importance of symbolic measures (citizenship ceremonies, promotional 
campaigns etc.) and media strategies (training journalists, promoting journalists with an 
immigrant background, placing positive reports about immigration related issues etc.) to 
promote naturalisation. These measures could potentially increase naturalisation rates 
independent of changing citizenship laws and procedures as such. 
The legal obstacles have been well researched for each EU country. These same obstacles drew 
the most attention from participants of the national roundtables. Apart from major legal 
changes, minor procedural changes (e.g. permitted interruptions in the residence requirement 
or conditions for the proof of documentation) could have a significant impact on naturalisation. 
The potential of minor technical changes are often ignored in the debate, because, according to 
some, civil servants and local authorities are not consulted sufficiently. Minor changes in the law 
may also be favourable at times because they usually operate below the radar of sensitive public 
opinion.   
 
Moreover, much of the discussion on citizenship tends to stress requirements for ordinary 
residence-based naturalisation. While this is of major importance, other forms of acquiring 
citizenship are usually neglected. According to participants in some countries, changing 
naturalisation policies and procedures may not be enough to deliver the big impact that is 
needed. In countries with large and long-settled non-citizen populations, it would take decades 
for these communities to naturalise even if legal conditions were relaxed. Strong ius soli 
provisions or special access for immigrants arriving at a young age may deserve more attention. 
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There was general consensus that the implementation of citizenship laws through 
administrative procedures can be equally strong deterrents for naturalisation compared to the 
legal requirements themselves. Strikingly, national roundtable participants highlighted the 
deficiencies of public administration in several EU countries. These challenges are partly caused 
by the institutional set-up and administrative regulations.  However, they can also be produced 
by the incapacity and ineffectiveness of authorities. The biggest effects emerge from 
multiannual delays in procedures, use of discretionary power that leads to arbitrary refusals 
and unequal treatment, disproportionate burden of documentation, and inaccessible appeal 
systems.  
Like any policy-relevant issue, citizenship policies are subject to political environments and 
dynamics. An assessment of the political discourse and the relevant players in the citizenship 
debate may explain why certain policies were adopted and where there are potential venues for 
action. The analysis of the national roundtables revealed three main points:  
1) Many political parties avoid citizenship reform because it is regarded as too 
sensitive. As a result of perceived anti-immigrant attitudes in the wider public, 
politicians are anxious about losing votes and wasting political capital. Several 
participants in a number of countries claimed that the society is more comfortable 
with reform than political parties are.  
 
2) While overestimating reform resistance in general public opinion, political parties 
may also underestimate immigrants. The ‘immigrant vote’ is still a non-issue in most 
EU countries. Despite considerable immigrant constituencies especially in urban 
areas, there has been limited debate on attracting immigrants as voters at the 
national level. Conservative parties show little interest in facilitating access to 
citizenship in the belief that immigrants are more likely to vote for left-wing parties. 
However, this claim is not supported by evidence in many countries. Referring to the 
most recent example of US presidential elections, stakeholders in many countries 
said that political parties may be well advised to start accommodating immigrants 
from early on rather than risking their political future in the long run.  
 
3) Civil society organisations are not strongly represented in the citizenship debate. 
Positions diverge and there is lack of coordination between groups with similar 
interest. Immigrant organisations are not perceived as vital players in this debate. 
Many are fragmented along ethnic or religious lines. They are also often focused on 
providing services for clients rather than representing their interests. Civil society 
participants and academics stated the need for better coordination of interests, 
professional lobbying as well as awareness campaigns to inform the public and 
positively change an often biased discourse about immigration and citizenship.  
 
 
 
8 
 
3. Methodology 
 
National partner organisation organised the national roundtables in Austria, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom in coordination with 
the Migration Policy Group. Ten events took place between November 2012 and February 2013 
as seen in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: List of National roundtables 
# Country City Date National Partner 
1 Austria Vienna 19/11/2012 Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen 
2 Estonia Tallinn 18/01/2013 Tallinn University 
3 France Paris 07/11/2012 France terre d'asile 
4 Germany Berlin 22/01/2013 Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 
5 Hungary Budapest 24/01/2013 Menedek Hungarian Association of Migrants 
6 Ireland Dublin 10/12/2012 Immigrant Council of Ireland 
7 Italy Rome 31/01/2013 Iniziative e studi sulla multietnicità (ISMU) 
8 Portugal Lisbon 28/01/2013 Luso-American Foundation 
9 Spain Barcelona 14/12/2012 Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 
10 UK London 28/11/2012 Runnymede Trust 
 
General structure 
The national roundtables were structured in two focus group sessions, each lasting 90 minutes. 
Focus groups consisted of civil servants, politicians, academic experts, citizenship lawyers and 
representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These stakeholders had proven 
expertise and long-term experience in the field of citizenship acquisition, in particular 
naturalisation. Austria, Estonia, Germany and Spain separated politicians and civil servants into 
one focus group and civil society actors into a second focus group. France, Hungary, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and the UK organised one focus group for all stakeholders. 
First, the ACIT citizenship indicator results for the respective country were presented to 
roundtable participants by two ACIT researchers.  Next, a moderator guided the discussion 
based on a structured questionnaire. In most cases, the moderator was a staff member of the 
national partner organisation with experience in conducting expert focus groups. The results of 
the ACIT research served as a kick-off and inspiration for debate while, in most cases, the 
research itself was not the main topic of discussion.  
The discussion was recorded and transcribed by the national partner organisation and analysed 
by the Migration Policy Group. The transcripts were subjected to basic content analysis.  The 
Nvivo software package was used for coding and a basic statistical analysis. Participants were 
assured of anonymity to facilitate open and fruitful debate. 
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Participants 
The breakdown of participants in the national roundtables can be seen in Figure 2.  Overall, the 
largest stakeholder representation (as part of the 132 participants) in the national roundtables 
came from NGOs. The group of NGOs included a range of think tanks, advocacy groups, 
immigrant organisations, service providers, consultative bodies, social worker and, in a few 
instances, trade unions. Academic experts were professors and researchers at universities and 
other research institutes. Citizenship lawyers made up the smallest stakeholder representation. 
Few lawyers focusing on citizenship are involved in the policy debate on citizenship and they 
are often affiliated with a political party or research institute. Politicians were mainly from 
centre-left and green parties with a few exceptions coming from centre-right parties (e.g. UK, 
Germany). Civil servants made up a key group in many countries providing practical hands-on 
experience and the needed detail to assess legal and procedural obstacles to citizenship 
acquisition. The composition of national roundtables varied slightly because of the difficulty to 
attract politicians and civil servants in some countries (e.g. Ireland, Italy, and UK) and because 
of different salience of citizenship in political debates at the time. 
 
Figure 2: Participants of the National roundtables  
National 
roundtable  
NGOs 
Academic  
experts 
Citizenship 
 lawyers 
Politicians 
Civil  
Servants 
Total 
number  
of 
participants 
Austria 3 4 0 1 2 10 
Estonia 8 0 0 2 4 14 
France 3 2 1 0 4 10 
Germany 5 2 1 6 5 19 
Hungary 1 4 0 2 2 9 
Ireland 14 2 1 0 0 17 
Italy 5 2 0 0 0 7 
Portugal 6 2 0 2 6 16 
Spain 6 1 2 4 4 17 
UK 8 3 2 0 1 14 
Total 58 21 7 17 29 133 
 
The guiding questions of the first focus group session focused on the factors that influence why 
immigrants naturalise. This includes the personal motivation and incentives of immigrants to 
become citizens (1), legal or procedural obstacles that may deter them from applying (2) and 
the degree to which attitudes in society encourage or discourage immigrants to become citizens 
(3). This first session also addressed the link between the acquisition of citizenship and various 
forms of integration into society (4).  
The second session contained questions about the political environment surrounding the 
debate on citizenship (5) and the relevant policy drivers (6). Stakeholders were asked for their 
opinions about necessary policy changes and the likeliness of changes in the future in light of 
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the current political context (7). Questions were used to guide the discussion of stakeholders 
and to ensure similarity of roundtables across all selected EU countries. The focus group 
discussion allowed exploring certain topics more in depth with regard to national particularities 
(e.g. special naturalisation procedures in Hungary, national minorities in Estonia).  
This report focusses on reasons for and against acquiring citizenship in the EU. These reasons 
include emotional motivation, practical advantages, the societal context and legal and 
procedural obstacles. Secondly, this report describes different opportunity structures for policy 
changes regarding citizenship in ten EU countries. The anecdotal evidence presented in this 
report should be seen as complementary to the legal databases and quantitative citizenship 
indicators provided by the ACIT project.   
 
4. Results: Why do immigrants become citizens in EU countries? 
 
When immigrants have settled in their country of residence for an extended period of time, the 
following questions may begin to cross their mind: Do I want to become a citizen? Do I feel like I 
belong here? What are the advantages and what are the disadvantages of acquiring the 
citizenship of my host country? Does this society want me to become a citizen? How difficult is it 
to become a citizen? Upon analysis of the ten national roundtables, the questions and answers 
about the access to citizenship appear to be more common across different EU countries than 
often assumed given the different context of each EU country.  
This chapter will provide a comprehensive overview of the main reasons why immigrants do or 
do not become citizens according to key stakeholders at the national roundtables. Roundtable 
participants were asked about which factors influence naturalisation rates. The reasons why 
immigrants naturalise was the starting point for most discussions in the selected EU countries..  
 
 
 
 
4.1 Laws and procedures:  How difficult is naturalisation? 
 
Demanding legal requirements and long procedures for acquiring citizenship can be a deterrent 
that keeps immigrants from applying. Stakeholders at the national roundtables were asked to 
discuss the most crucial laws and procedures that are perceived as barriers to the acquisition of 
citizenship, in particular through ordinary residence-based naturalisation. While the laws for 
ordinary naturalisation vary significantly across different countries, the general types of 
requirements are largely the same: residence, multiple nationality, language and civic 
knowledge, criminal record, and economic resources. Most procedural issues identified by  
participants can be grouped according to the ACIT citizenship implementation indicators:  
Promotion, documentation, bureaucracy, discretion, and judicial review.  
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4.1.1 Legal obstacles 
In most cases, the major legal issues raised at each roundtable correspond to the results of the 
ACIT Citizenship Law Indicators for ordinary residence-based naturalisation.2 Much of the 
conversation in Austria, Estonia, and Germany addressed citizenship laws. In comparison, these 
countries have overall more restrictive legal provisions for citizenship acquisition than most EU 
countries. The major topics of discussion are also represented by word clouds (visualisation of 
word frequencies in national roundtables) for each country (see Annex). The topics most 
discussed in each country were often the legal requirements with regard to which the country 
diverged most from their fellow EU-15 or EU-12 countries respectively (see ACIT citizenship 
law indicators). For example, residence and economic resource requirements are the main issue 
in Austria; ius soli provisions, multiple nationality and language requirements in Estonia; 
multiple nationality in Germany; and residence in Spain.  
Figure 3: Number of interventions by roundtable participants 
Legal requirements Austria Estonia France Germany Ireland Portugal Spain UK 
Residence 5 0 0 5 1 2 4 0 
Dual nationality 3 10 0 16 0 3 0 0 
Language 2 7 3 4 4 7 1 4 
Civic knowledge 1 3 2 2 0 1 3 2 
Criminal record 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
Economic Resources  6 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 
 
        
Special naturalisation 
(families, refugees) 
2 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 
Other citizenship laws 
(e.g. ius soli) 
1 12 0 6 0 8 0 0 
Total Interventions 22 34 7 39 7 23 8 10 
Note: This table indicates which legal issues were most discussed in one country. This data is not comparable across 
countries. Italy was excluded from this graph because the roundtable did not follow the questionnaire. The Italian debate 
revolved mainly around the issue of bureaucracy. Hungary’s transcript was not coded. Special naturalisation on grounds 
of ‘Hungarian ancestry’ was mostly debated. See National Handbooks for both countries (Annex). 
 
Beyond ordinary naturalisation, there are other ways of acquiring citizenship, such as ius 
sanguinis (birthright citizenship based on descent) or ius soli (birthright citizenship based on 
birth in the territory). In Estonia, ius soli received particular attention due to the large Russian-
speaking minority excluded from Estonian citizenship. Several experts in Germany claimed that 
ordinary naturalisation will not be sufficient to deal with the great share of long-settled 
immigrants in the country. It would take decades to naturalise this large group of foreigners 
even if naturalisation rates increased significantly.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/eudo-citizenship-law-indicators.  
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Residence  
Residence requirements are often a major part of citizenship debates and reforms. They are 
symbolic, easy to change and politically less controversial than other requirements. Residence 
was heavily  debated in Austria and Spain where the state currently requires ten years 
residence before immigrants can apply for ordinary naturalisation. In addition to the number of 
years required, the type of residence considered and the allowed interruptions have been 
identified as major legal obstacles to naturalisation. Some EU countries require citizenship 
candidates to hold a long-term residence permit at the time of application. This means in many 
cases that the actual residence requirement is three to five years longer than the formal 
requirement. In other countries, any kind of legal residence in the country may be considered 
for naturalisation. 
An interruption of residence of a single day could disqualify for naturalisation, as was 
mentioned in Austria. Minor interruptions due to a failure to renew a residence permit in time 
can be a violation of the residence requirement. The interruption requirement can pose a 
serious obstacle, for example, for international students’ and international labour migrants’ 
access to citizenship. After finishing their studies many international students are employed on 
a temporary basis. International business professionals may be required to spend time abroad 
due to intercompany placements. This could eventually lead to an interruption of residence and 
ineligibility for naturalisation. 
Simply reducing residence will have a limited effect on overall application numbers among the 
large, long-settled foreign populations in countries like Germany and Austria. Even if 
applications increased, it would still take decades to deal with the remaining cases. Instead, 
participants asserted the need for stronger ius soli provisions. In this context, the additional 
benefit of reduced residence requirements is a positive signal towards immigrants that they are 
welcome as full members of society. 
Multiple nationality 
The requirements to renounce one’s previous citizenship, which still exist in the minority of EU 
countries, are seen as one of the major deterrents to naturalisation among many types of 
immigrants. The renunciation requirement was a key debate among stakeholders in Germany, 
Estonia, and, to some extent, Austria. 
In Estonia, the refusal of multiple nationality affects the large Russian-speaking minority in the 
country. While most participants identified this requirement as a major obstacle, there was less 
consensus on whether accepting multiple nationality is the right move forward.  
From my experience, one particular hardship is that even if these 10 years are interrupted by only 
one single day, the period begins to run afresh; I know specific cases with which I was approached 
and where the authority is so to speak helpless because the law stipulates an uninterrupted 
residence of 10 years.  
                              (Politician, Austria) 
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Germany recently started to accept multiple nationality for EU immigrants which led to a sharp 
increase in naturalisation. Currently, 50% of naturalisations in Germany lead to toleration of 
multiple nationality under special provisions.  
Children of foreigners born in Germany 
automatically receive German citizenship at 
birth regardless of any other affiliations. 
However, these individuals have to choose one 
citizenship between their 18th and 23rd 
birthdays. The so-called ‘option duty’  
(‘Optionspflicht’) has started affecting larger 
numbers of cases since the beginning of 2013. 
There was consensus among experts in Germany 
that the situation caused by the option duty is 
unsustainable, legally contestable, and a wrong sign for integration of immigrants. As Germany 
faces federal elections in September, the multiple nationality requirement is a hot topic of 
debate. 
 
Language and civic knowledge 
The EU has seen a trend of formalising the language level required for naturalisation and 
permanent residence over the last decade. The principle of language requirements for 
naturalisation was not generally contested at the national roundtables. Citizenship or civic 
knowledge test were mostly not perceived to be major obstacles to naturalisation. While pass 
rates are commonly quite high, the test might be seen as an obstacle by future applicants, 
according to a study3 cited by the German national roundtable. Obstacles may also arise in the 
way the test is implemented (e.g. can it be repeated, how expensive is it, is the test material 
available, are there preparation courses?) and which subjects are covered. Moreover, questions 
arose about the effectiveness of a citizenship test to prove the level of integration or certain 
links with the country. 
 
The major issues discussed were the exemptions for certain vulnerable groups (i.e. refugees, 
elderly, illiterate, and disabled) and the support provided for immigrants to reach the required 
level of language proficiency. The B1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference 
for Languages is perceived as too demanding for immigrants with lower educational 
                                                          
3
 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2012), Einbürgerungsverhalten von Ausländerinnen und 
Ausländern in Deutschland sowie Erkenntnisse zu Optionsplichtigen Ergebnisse der BAMF-
Einbürgerungsstudie 2011, www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb15-
einbuergerungsverhalten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
But there are, of course, many countries that have taken it lately. But whether it will go well in the 
end or will they do as Holland did and turn back? We don’t know for sure.  
                                         (Civil Servant, Estonia) 
If someone would eliminate this 
requirement, this would remove a 
major obstacle for many applicants, 
and then you could certainly 
significantly increase the figures.  
 
(Politician, Germany) 
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backgrounds, among whom many are refugees. In addition, B1 was mentioned as too restrictive 
for elderly persons who do not have the capacity to learn a new language compared to younger 
generations. Older generations may also not be familiar with formal written tests, as was 
mentioned in the case of Estonia.  
 
 
In terms of support, experts in Portugal called for a 
return of the official government-provided language 
test which was dropped in 2010. Immigrants currently 
have to use official language institutes to prove their 
language level. The UK government has cut funding for 
language courses which is essential for many 
immigrants to reach the demanding B1 level. High costs 
for courses can be a big obstacle for low income groups. 
Participants in Ireland also discussed the need for 
establishing a clear standards and support. 
 
 
Countries that assess civic knowledge 
through interviews risk that too much 
discretion in the procedure will result in 
unequal or disproportionate treatment of 
applicants. This was mentioned primarily 
in Spain, France and Portugal. Some 
countries are also lacking clear guidelines 
about what constitutes a sufficient level of 
country knowledge.  
 
 
Criminal record 
All countries require immigrants to show a clean criminal record.  In some cases, this 
requirement also takes the form of a ‘good character’ requirement. The criminal record 
requirement was not widely debated at national roundtables. The obstacles in this area include 
the severity of the crime and the statute of limitations (i.e. if the offense expires after time). In 
Ireland, Austria and the UK, almost any offense can theoretically lead to a refusal of citizenship. 
In several countries, criminal convictions are never erased from the record.  
B1 represents a major hurdle because many people get along fairly well in everyday life but cannot 
achieve this due to educational disadvantages, professional activities, lack of time or similar things.  
                              
 (NGO, Austria) 
Citizenship is made more 
difficult because of the drop in 
funding for ESOL courses, the 
multiplication of barriers to 
access but also the impact of 
austerity and other policies 
which affect naturalisations 
indirectly.  
 
(Citizenship lawyer, UK) 
          
We must ensure staff training because it’s 
not that easy to conduct an interview with 
objective criteria and without falling into a 
big brother interview with 2 000 questions 
on which we’ll judge the poor guy sitting 
there. We also need to work on a guide for 
the assimilation interview in order to 
support agents and migrants.  
           (NGO, France) 
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Economic Resources 
Some countries have experienced strong debates about the level and procedures to prove the 
economic resources, which are required in only around half the EU countries.  In Austria, for 
example, economic resource requirements were considered one of the major legal obstacles for 
naturalisation. Income is not only required at a certain point of time, but has to be proven over 
the past three years. Since 2010, regular expenditures for rent, loan repayment, garnishment or 
alimony payment have to be taken into account when calculating an applicant’s income level 
raising the required level of disposable income. This presents an additional burden for persons 
with developing, part-time or temporary employment (e.g. international students, mothers). 
Income requirements above minimum pension levels (approximately € 2000 for a couple with a 
child) exclude vulnerable groups, particularly low income families. Stakeholders in Austria 
highlighted that the proof of continuous and regular income over the three years prior to 
application poses not only a serious challenge for the applicant but also for the administration 
in terms of checking all documents.  
 
 
 
Now it might be a bit facetious, but you wouldn’t revoke my citizenship if I got a traffic offence, 
something that small wouldn’t have any effect on whether I’m entitled to being an Irish citizen, but 
for somebody that’s applying for it that that can be a serious factor, and it’s expecting of people a 
level of good character that isn’t clearly defined, that is unattainable.  
                                        (NGO, Ireland) 
One thing which is very difficult in practice is the disclosure and calculation of one’s subsistence 
over a period of three years. If someone is not working continuously (…) for example, in the case of 
self-employed persons, it is enormously difficult to make a real calculation. It is difficult for the 
concerned persons who have to provide plenty of documents, partially this does not work out even 
with professional assistance, and also very difficult for us to carry out the correct calculations. 
Sometimes we have to inquire at many other authorities including the tax office, police etc. where 
we cannot control when they will answer us and the results of determination have to be completely 
up-to-date during the decision. (…) If there is a delay or one sheet is missing, this means starting 
from scratch, and then it will take another half a year. This means that the conditions which are to 
be verified are so numerous and so complex that this creates major difficulties not only for the 
authorities but also for the concerned persons.                                        
(Civil servant, Austria) 
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4.1.2 Procedural obstacles 
Obstacles in law are implemented in practice by state authorities.  Most policy areas show signs 
of discrepancy between formal laws and their application in practice. In some cases these 
procedures can undermine favourable legal conditions. At national roundtables, participants 
were asked about the obstacles in the naturalisation procedure in their country that are most 
severe. The underlying ACIT study captured the procedural side of naturalisation in five 
dimensions of citizenship implementation: promotion (How much do authorities encourage 
applicants to apply?), documentation (How easily can applicants prove they meet the 
conditions?), discretion (How much room do authorities have to interpret conditions), 
bureaucracy (How easy is it for authorities to come to a decision?), review (How strong is 
judicial oversight of the procedure?).4 The results of the national roundtables will be presented 
along the same categories. 
Similar to the discussion on legal obstacles, the national roundtable generally reflected the same 
issues that were identified by the ACIT project’s corresponding citizenship indicators. On 
average, national roundtable participants discussed the issues in their country that diverged the 
most from other  EU-15 or EU-12 countries. In some countries, participants see implementation 
as the primary obstacles while laws are perceived as favourable and open (Portugal, Estonia, 
and Ireland). In other countries, both laws and implementation are seen as demanding (Austria, 
Italy, France, and Germany). The discretion of authorities was identified as one of the major 
obstacles in France and Germany (differences in implementation in the regions), Ireland 
(absolute discretion) and Spain (discretionary assessment of language and civic knowledge). 
Fees were mostly discussed in Portugal and the UK. Bureaucracy was perceived as a particular 
challenge in Spain and Italy. The dominant topics of discussion are also represented by word 
clouds (visualisation of word frequencies in national roundtables) for each country (see Annex). 
Overall, the discussion revealed the importance of assessing the implementation of procedures, 
which is often neglected in the debate on citizenship policies. The ACIT Citizenship 
Implementation indicators are an innovative tool to compare procedures across countries. Due 
to the complexity and variability of procedures in countries, regions and municipalities, the 
national roundtables have proven essential to provide more background information on 
procedures in practice.   
According to civil servants participating in the roundtables, many obstacles in the procedures 
could be remedied by small changes and compliance with minimum standards of public 
administration and good governance. Improving the procedures requires the involvement of 
civil servants and local administrations in the policy debate. According to roundtable 
participants, frontline staff and service-providers are often marginal in debates on citizenship 
policy. Stakeholders see great potential in improving procedures because they are less 
controversial and too technical to require public debate.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/citimpindicators  
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Figure 4: Number of interventions by roundtable participants 
 
Austria Estonia France Germany Ireland Portugal Spain UK 
Discretion 5 0 6 8 7 1 8 1 
Fees 3 0 0 1 0 10 0 5 
Bureaucracy 4 2 2 9 6 1 14 0 
Documentation 0 0 0 5 1 4 0 0 
Promotion 0 6 0 8 3 5 1 1 
Review 3 0 1 1 4 2 0 0 
Miscellaneous 0 5 1 2 1 2 3 2 
 
Note: This table indicates which procedural issues were most discussed within one country. This data is not comparable 
across countries. Italy was excluded because the roundtable did not strictly follow the harmonised questionnaire. The 
Italian debate revolved mainly around bureaucracy. Hungary’s transcript was not coded. Special naturalisation on 
grounds of ‘Hungarian ancestry’ was mostly debated there. See National Handbooks for both countries (Annex). 
 
Promotion 
Immigrants may not apply for naturalisation simply because they are not informed about the 
procedures or the benefits of citizenship. High costs for the application and requirements (e.g. 
language test and preparatory language courses) may discourage immigrants from applying. 
Good quality information in different languages, an online checking service and a PR campaign 
are all measures that could be used to raise awareness and promote transparency and 
effectiveness of naturalisation procedures. Most stakeholders agreed that countries can do a 
better job at providing all useful information.  It is up for debate whether the state should take 
on responsibility to advertise citizenship or simply provide favourable conditions for its 
acquisition. While some participants raised doubts about the effectiveness of campaigns in 
Germany, positive examples were mentioned in Ireland.  
Just as participants disagreed about 
immigrants’ ‘emotional’ vs. ‘practical’ 
reasons to naturalise, so too were opinions 
mixed about the symbolic meaning of 
citizenship ceremonies. Ceremonies were 
recognised as an effective promotional 
measure in countries like Ireland. When 
ceremonies are attended by high-level 
dignitaries and the media, ceremonies can not only be popular among immigrants, but also 
popular among the public as a way to promote a more ‘welcoming society’. However, some 
people are less comfortable with the idea of national pride and symbols. For example, a civil 
servant in Portugal called ceremonies ‘a hollow thing, empty and something ridiculous.’  
 
 
It was really surprising for me how popular 
[ceremonies] turned out to be. 
                      
(Civil servant, Estonia) 
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I think the ceremonies have had an impact in terms of public awareness. People in this room are 
very tuned in to immigration issues and so on, but it has had an impact on people like my mother-
in-law who will pick up the paper, you know, and go “oh, hello, she’s black and she’s Irish”.  
                         (NGO, Ireland) 
Costs were highlighted as a major practical obstacle for naturalisation in the EU countries with 
some of the highest total costs (Austria, Ireland, and United Kingdom). Federal fees in Austria 
can vary between € 700 and 900 depending on the applicant in addition to regional fees that 
can range from € 100 to 1500. Application fees for a couple with one child can amount to € 
3000 in the worst case. There are no exemptions from fees in Austria.  
 
On top of application fees, many immigrants face 
major costs for language courses. Recent reforms 
in the UK have made it harder to naturalise 
according to several national roundtable 
participants. Cuts in funding for language courses 
(ESOL) are an obstacle to acquire citizenship for 
immigrants with lower educational backgrounds. 
Increasing tuition fees must be seen in the context 
of already high application fees. According to one 
participant in Austria, going through all course levels to B1 will at least cost € 2500 for 
immigrants that are not eligible for subsidised courses. Additional costs include, for example, 
translation and certification fees for certain documents from the country of origin. 
 
 
Documentation 
ACIT documentation indicators cover (1) the type of documents required for each naturalisation 
requirement, (2) how this information is acquired (e.g. automatically by the authority or by the 
applicant), (3) if translation and certification of documents is needed and (4) whether there are 
exemptions from documentation for some vulnerable groups such as refugees. The required 
documentation for naturalisation can be a major bureaucratic and financial burden especially 
when documents from the country of origin are required.  
Naturalisation procedures in countries like France and Ireland are not clear about the 
documentation required. Some types of documentation can not only be a challenge for 
applicants to provide but also for authorities to process (e.g. documents for the proof of 
sufficient means of support for a period of three years in Austria). Another issue of 
documentation are costs for translating and certifying these documents. For some applicants, 
particularly refugees, it might be impossible to obtain certain documents such as their birth 
certificate or passport.  
Without the affordability issue, most 
people would be keen to apply. It is 
not a voluntary choice not to apply. 
                          
(NGO, UK) 
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Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy – the question of how quickly 
authorities come to a decision about a 
naturalisation claim – was identified as a major 
problem in a number of countries.  In Spain, Italy, 
and to some degree France, there were particular 
cases where national stakeholders voiced 
concerns about the general capacity of 
authorities in appropriate time. Bureaucracy can 
be measured in terms of (1) how many 
authorities are involved in a process, (2) how 
long it takes and (3) how transparent it is.  
In countries with highly decentralised structures 
(e.g. Germany, Austria, Spain), complex 
institutional structures may create a burden for 
the administration and can lead to the different 
treatment of applicants in different regions of the 
country. In Italy, the major obstacle is seen as a 
lack of public administration and the inability of national agencies to enforce common 
standards across Italy. According to roundtable participants in Spain, the waiting time can 
amount to several years due to bureaucratic procedures (coordination between different 
agencies), large backlogs of applications, understaffing of offices and an absence of legal time 
limits. This waiting time adds to the normal residence requirement for ordinary naturalisation 
in each country. 
I think that’s an obstacle, according to our experience. We have some cases of people from Angola 
who ask for documents which are impossible to obtain, such as the father’s birth certificate. I’m 
doing the follow up of the case of a cousin of mine (…). His father’s birth certificate burned during 
the war, he does not have proof. The truth is that he hasn’t been able to obtain Portuguese 
citizenship and like him there are many others.  
 (Politician, Portugal) 
In Spain, we have the nationality after 13-14 years, not 10 years. I'd like to make that clear. After 
10 years, if you ask for an appointment, you will get it after 2.5-3 years and after that it's a long 
process, 1.5 years. For 99% of the Pakistanis who have nationality it took 15 years.  
                                   (NGO, Spain) 
One of the really frustrating things is 
not being able to go somewhere to see 
what stage your application is at (…). 
You don’t know if it’s been forgotten 
about, you don’t know if it’s been put 
on hold for a reason, you don’t know if 
it’s at the bottom of the pile. They 
(immigrants) are even afraid to do 
that, even if they have the contacts, 
because they’re afraid that if they ask 
the question at the wrong time, it’ll 
put their application right back to the 
bottom of the list again. 
(NGO, Ireland) 
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‘Transparency is the main issue, because the assessment criteria are not really known by foreigners 
wishing to become French citizen. Guidelines are always confidential. Sometimes circulars 
(guidelines) are not published. (…) It prevents associations to provide aid to people, who wish to 
become French citizen, to access these data. And maybe, part of these instructions should be 
translated in a public language, eventually through a debate on these criteria, which are actually 
deduced from law or case-law.’  
                         (Civil servant, France) 
  
 
Transparency is another overlooked principle of good public administration in naturalisation 
procedures. Openness and transparency from the administration about its decision reduces the 
likelihood of maladministration, corruption, perceived discrimination, and arbitrary refusals. 
Only through transparency can immigrants access the necessary information to appeal the 
decision taken by authorities. In this way, the principle of transparency is crucial for holding 
authorities accountable to respect the law. 
 
 
Discretion 
Discretion is the power of authorities to decide or act according to their free judgment or choice 
without being accountable according to clear public legal guidelines. In the context of 
naturalisation, there are generally two forms of procedures. The first one is the discretionary 
assessment of certain naturalisation requirements, such as language skills, civic knowledge 
skills or ‘good character’ requirements. For example, in Spain and France the language and civic 
knowledge requirements are assessed through an interview with an officer in the local 
administration. The questions of the interview and the expected answers are not clearly 
defined. As a consequence, the assessment of language and civic knowledge is based on the 
discretionary judgement of the interviewer. This can cause unequal treatment of applicants 
across different local communities. Furthermore, it can lead to unfounded refusals of 
applications based on subjective judgement.  
In Germany, the citizenship law is a federal law. But it’s implemented in the states. And the states 
are bound to certain regulations when there’s an administrative regulation. These exist, but they 
sometimes date back to 1999 and are obsolete in many areas. (…) We also don’t just have 
different organisational structures but also different state regulations that wander around 
through different implementation guidelines. From this situation, we don’t just have a legal 
problem but an implementation problem. Here, the federal government has a duty and it’s not 
doing anything at the moment.  
                                   (Civil servant, Germany) 
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Countries may have not only discretionary naturalisation requirements but also an entirely 
discretionary procedure. In this case, naturalisation is not an entitlement, but a favour or 
privilege granted by the state. Applicants can be refused even if they have formally met all the 
requirements. It is also possible that the authorities use their discretion in a positive way to 
consider an applicant’s personal circumstances. Administrations in immigrant-friendly 
enclaves, such as Vienna, used their power to make exemptions and raise their naturalisation 
rate.  
Still, most participants spoke negatively of 
discretionary procedures. For example, 
‘absolute discretion’ is the major 
naturalisation problem in Ireland. According 
to roundtable participants, the responsible 
minister can refuse an applicant based on a 
minor traffic offence.  
 
‘I'd like to raise the issue of the differences of treatment by the prefecture and the agents’ training. 
(…) We're talking about the new circular (guideline) which induces many changes compared to the 
required resources and precarious people, but it’s still the same, the interpretation is still at the 
discretion of the agent. We have nothing that is clear or readable. I think there is a necessary 
modification, in order to introduce a common training with clarity and visibility.’  
(Civil servant, France) 
…yesterday an immigration law 
attorney was telling me that one of her 
clients, in the process of obtaining her 
passport, was asked the following 
question: What is a flamenco? A 
language? A bird? Or a type of music? 
And that was the question for obtaining 
her passport! 
 (Civil servant, Spain) 
Many immigrants ask themselves: Why should I apply, when is this so difficult? The application 
goes to the police, to the financial office, to the social services office, back and forth. And it takes 
so long time. That’s a process where the agencies also need to say why it takes so long. So that 
citizens can understand. Otherwise you think the application won’t be done because you’re 
Kurdish or Turkish and you feel discriminated against. The agencies don’t do this, they say merely 
we need a piece of A4 paper to be filled out.  
       (NGO, Germany) 
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Review 
Most countries in the EU offer the right to appeal a negative decision on a naturalisation 
application and the right to a reasoned decision. However, Ireland and Hungary are among the 
few EU countries that have no such access to judicial review. Poland and Belgium have recently 
changed their procedures to grant these rights. In response to arbitrary decisions on 
naturalisation in Ireland, many participants have highlighted the need for an appeals system 
which still does not exist in Irish law.  
 
Another issue of judicial review is access to appeal procedures in practice. Immigrants can in 
principle appeal to the highest court in Austria, however, this is virtually impossible in practice 
according to national roundtable participants. Lawyer and court fees, long waiting periods and 
lengthy trials are a major obstacle for any judicial review. Accordingly, several participants 
highlighted the need for a second ordinary instance in Austria. 
 
We need to know the criteria or policies that the decision makers are relying on when they’re 
making decisions, and at the moment in Ireland, we don’t know those decisions and the 
Department of Justice is refusing to give out that policy. We know they have it, but they’re not 
giving it to us.  
 (Citizenship lawyer, Ireland) 
I did have an experience as a student applying for a J1 visa in the states and I was refused, and they 
didn’t tell me why and they didn’t have to tell me why and I applied again the following year and 
they refused and they did tell me why. They told they refused because I was refused the previous 
year. 
(NGO, Ireland) 
I have received many phone calls from people who are struggling or who have been refused 
citizenship. Sometimes for reasons that are wrong even on the face of it. And because there are no 
process of appeal to citizenship, I think it is very frustrating for the people. In one case, a child who 
was living in Ireland almost all of its life. And then because he was the child of migrant workers she 
was registered from the age of 16, and then at the age of 18 she applied for naturalization she was 
turned down because the officer looked that she was only two years registered in the state as 
opposed to five. And there’s no appeal to this, so now she has to wait for another three years. 
 (NGO, Dublin) 
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4.1.3 General administrative capacity 
The capacity and quality of public administration was repeatedly highlighted as a challenge for 
naturalisation. The effects of poor quality public services are long delays and waiting periods in 
the naturalisation procedure. A multitude of reasons cause severe delays: Understaffing, lack of 
staff training, the institutional set-up of the administration and the mere complexity of the law. 
In Spain, it can take up to three years to get an appointment at the naturalisation office after the 
official residence requirement has already been met. Then, processing the application can take 
up to another two years in some regions according to Spanish stakeholders.  
 
Understaffing often creates inefficiency. An academic participant in Spain stated that 40 staff 
officials in the national registry office process hundreds of thousands of applications. Irish 
participants reported cases where applicants were not even informed that the authority had 
received their application. In addition, up to five different staff members can process one 
application in some cases. Applications of family members are sometimes not processed jointly 
(e.g. Ireland). Participants in France have expressed a need for staff training. In particular, staff 
that lead the ‘integration interview’ to assess language and civic knowledge training should 
receive more training in order to avoid unequal treatment and arbitrary judgement.  
 
Another cause of poor quality administration 
is the sheer complexity of citizenship laws 
that has accumulated over decades, 
sometimes centuries. According to legal 
specialists in Spain, the laws are simply 
obsolete and difficult to reform. In Spain, 
immigration and nationality have not been 
dealt with together. In the UK, citizenship 
lawyers argued that the citizenship reform 
proposed by the Labour Party in 2009 was 
abandoned by the new coalition government, 
to a large degree because it was too ‘messy 
and complex’ to implement.  
 
 
 
 
So it is completely absurd that it takes two years to get an appointment. (…) Why are public 
finances so efficient in this country, while in others they are not? That is, there needs to be a 
political will to make this administration efficient once and for all. The immigration offices work 
well now, don’t they? So the naturalisations should also.  
 (Civil servant, Spain) 
For example, last week I had a family who 
were naturalised. The woman was a 
recognised asylum-seeking refugee and 
had gotten dual citizenship. The child was 
provisionally granted temporary multiple 
citizenship. The 17-year-old son had an 
assurance of citizenship. That’s a 
construction that the whole family 
doesn’t understand and the colleagues at 
the citizens’ office doesn’t either. The law 
is just very complex. 
 (Civil servant, Germany) 
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German civil servants reported that several elements of citizenship law, for example the 
renunciation requirements, have reached such a level of complexity that authorities struggle to 
process applications efficiently. One example is the ‘option duty’. As a result of a political 
compromise in 1999, children born in Germany to foreign citizen parents acquire German 
citizenship at birth in addition to their citizenship from the country of origin. However, by their 
23rd birthday, they have to renounce their foreign citizenship in order to retain the German 
one. If one fails to abide by this condition, German citizenship is automatically withdrawn. 
According to German experts, this rule is not only questionable from legal and fairness 
standpoints, but also in terms of the administrative burden it puts on authorities because this 
will affect 30-40000 cases annually from 2013. This is because in 2000 the rule was introduced 
with retroactive effect for children born 10 years earlier. Some participants argued that 
resources could be saved and efficiency improved if the option duty would be abandoned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the optional rule really takes off nationally with 30,000 to 40,000 (people), then we’ll need to 
hire a lot more personnel in all the states. The same would be true if we simplified the 
naturalisation regulations and the application numbers increased significantly. That really couldn’t 
be handled without putting a lot of money into it.  
 (Civil servant, Germany) 
As to the specific question of why the 2009 legislation was never implemented: By the time it was 
passed, it could not have been implemented by any government. If you look at those provisions, it 
had got completely unwieldy - concepts have been introduced (…) that necessitated redrafting the 
citizenship provisions in a way that made a complete mess after they would been redrafted to take 
account of the changes. It is incomprehensible.  
 (Citizenship lawyer, UK) 
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4.2 Personal motivation: head vs. heart 
Applying for naturalisation is inherently a personal decision. Becoming a citizen is about where 
you see your life in the future. Analysing the 
motivations of immigrants is important because 
the answers may help explain high or low 
naturalisation rates (the share of eligible 
immigrants that have naturalised). This analysis 
may also shed light on why certain groups (i.e. 
non-EU immigrants, refugees, work migrants, 
and immigrants from a certain country or region 
of origin) naturalise more often than others. The 
results of this analysis will help to clarify the 
different situations immigrants are in and the 
different legal or procedural obstacles that 
groups or immigrants face on their way to 
become citizens.  
The motivations to acquire a certain citizenship 
may depend largely on individual situations. The 
reasons to become a citizen do not only vary 
case by case, they also vary across different 
immigrant groups and different country 
contexts. Refugees fleeing their country of origin 
have greater incentives to naturalise in the EU 
than labour migrants that are looking for 
medium-term employment opportunities. EU 
migrants may be less likely to naturalise in 
another EU country because they already enjoy 
mobility rights and full access to the labour 
market. Moroccans may be more likely to 
naturalise in France than in Germany due to 
historical links between their country of 
residence and origin. Turks may not naturalise 
in Germany because they have to give up their 
Turkish citizenship. Language tests may be too 
challenging for people above 65 years.  
While one cannot generalise why immigrants 
become citizens in Europe, there were 
surprisingly recurring themes put forward by 
expert stakeholders at the roundtables.   
These themes can generally be grouped into the 
following: ‘emotional or subjective’ reasons and 
‘practical or objective’ ones.  As with most important decisions in life, the reasons to become a 
citizen involve both emotional and practical concerns that interact with each other. The 
Surely, there are different implications 
for different channels of family 
reunion, asylum applications or labour 
migration, which vary greatly between 
the represented countries. This reason 
for migration also reflects different life 
plans which are a significant 
explanatory variable (for 
naturalisation).  
    (NGO, Portugal) 
…It depends on age groups. I mean 
when you are 65 years old, it is hard to 
learn the language.  It is practically 
impossible for you and in many cases 
you don’t practically need it. So, in my 
electoral district (…) the question is 
why you should go through that long 
process which is relatively complicated 
for you.  
 
(Politician, Estonia) 
In the case of EU citizens, the incentive 
to acquire the Austrian citizenship is 
from my experience rather low 
compared to third country nationals 
because they already have the 
freedom of residence and free access 
to the labour market. In case of third-
country nationals, naturalisation 
means not only political rights, this is 
mainly about residence stability. 
 (Politician, Austria) 
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practical advantages may make citizenship 
even more meaningful for immigrants and 
thus reinforce their pride in naturalisation 
and their sense of belonging. 
Emotional or subjective reasons 
Some immigrants may opt for citizenship 
because they feel a strong sense of belonging 
in the country. Citizenship may be seen as 
evidence of an emotional attachment and 
identification with the country of residence. 
Citizenship is the logical step for this 
identification to be formally recognised by the 
state. In this case, the process of 
naturalisation is the alignment of the 
emotional status with the legal status. Oaths 
of allegiance and citizenship ceremonies are 
expressions of this symbolic dimension of 
citizenship. When immigrants are forced to 
decide between two citizenships, they are told 
to consider their identification with their 
country of residence and country of origin as 
contradictory, which affects their decision to 
naturalise. In addition, even when multiple 
nationality is accepted, some immigrant 
groups have low naturalisation rates 
simply because the cultural identity of 
their country of origin is perceived as 
strong (e.g. the case of Greeks in Germany). 
Children can reinforce a person’s sense of 
belonging. The motivation to naturalise 
may be higher if children have already 
obtained citizenship and grown up in the 
country.  
Citizenship of an EU country may have 
greater symbolic value depending on 
where non-EU immigrants come from. Especially immigrants from developing countries that 
come to Europe in pursuit of a better life may attribute a certain prestige to ‘being European’. 
 
 
 
 
I believe that this is closely linked to 
whether the family of someone is also 
living in the country in order to stay here. 
Children also represent a strong reason - 
the children acquire the citizenship and 
therefore people become naturalised.  
 
 (Academic expert, Austria) 
I also would like to leave a suggestion at 
the level of the symbolism, and I speak 
out of my experience, because having the 
citizenship of a country (…) has a 
perspective of identity and symbolism. 
And when the process reaches its end, the 
conservatory sends a photocopied letter, 
a very cold thing. And I think it’s very 
important because having the citizenship 
is being part of a country and I believe 
that more dignity could be given to the 
act when the process is closed down.  
(NGO, Portugal) 
But it’s also low with the Greeks. There is a 
famous saying, ‘I was born Greek and I will 
die Greek.’ This reproduces the strong 
identification. 
(Academic expert, Germany) 
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Practical or objective reasons 
The ‘symbolic and emotional’ element of the decision to naturalise was only mentioned by some 
NGO representatives and service-providers. Instead, most civil servants, politicians and 
academic experts preferred to talk about practical incentives. The most commonly mentioned 
practical reasons were discussed in this section. 
 
Security of residence and mobility:  
Citizenship of an EU country means visa-free 
travel in the rest of the European Union and 
facilitated travel to many countries outside of 
the EU. Citizenship offers the security of the 
right to return to the country of residence. 
Immigrants on long-term residence permits will 
lose their status if they spend too much time 
abroad. By contrast, citizenship in most cases 
cannot be lost simply on grounds of residence or 
extended travel in a foreign country. 
The ability to travel ‘back home’ to join family 
without the risk of losing your residence status 
is a strong incentive for many. As EU citizens, 
they have unrestricted access to labour markets 
in other EU countries. For example, older immigrants in Estonia naturalise to visit or join their 
children that have immigrated to other EU countries. For example, one expert in the Portuguese 
roundtable claimed that Portuguese citizenship is a way for many immigrants to access jobs in 
other EU countries. Similarly, applicants for Hungary’s special naturalisation procedure for 
persons abroad of Hungarian ancestry may be attractive because of access to EU labour market 
rather than ‘becoming’ Hungarian as such.  
 
Access to the labour market 
Citizenship provides access to many public sector jobs, such as positions in health care, 
education or public administration. In many countries, the public sector is a significant part of 
the overall job market. Citizenship may even be helpful for jobs that do not formally require 
We asked naturalised and non-
naturalised people about their 
reasons for and against taking up 
German citizenship. The second main 
argument named most often in this 
study was the statement “my 
residence is secure.” This means that 
for long-term resident aliens – third-
country nationals as well as those 
from EU countries – I don’t see any 
particular benefits to German 
citizenship.  
 (Civil Servant, Germany) 
A lot of people get the nationality in order to be able to leave. To be able to go back to their 
country of origin and be able to come back here, without having to start their residence permit 
authorisation (process) anew.   
 (Civil Servant, Spain) 
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citizenship, as noted by the OECD in its 
2011 publication ‘Naturalisation: A 
passport to integration?’. First of all, 
foreigners must provide more 
documentation about their residence, 
employment and criminal record. In 
addition, foreigners are less likely to 
work in stable, secure jobs and less likely 
to receive training, because employers 
may not know whether they will remain 
in the country. In economic terms, 
employers may perceive their foreign 
employees as a more risky investment in 
terms of time and money than citizen employees.  
Finally, businesses, particularly small and medium-
sized enterprises, may not understand the hiring 
process for employing foreigners and rather opt for 
citizens so as to avoid a perceived administrative 
burden. 
Citizenship also facilitates financial inclusion in 
terms of access to financial resources. In many EU 
countries, it is easier to get a loan from the bank if 
you are a citizen of the country. This issue is not 
often researched or mentioned in the national 
roundtables.  
 
Access to education 
Citizenship is an advantage in the area of education. This area was mentioned in the roundtables 
in Portugal, Germany, and Ireland. For example, foreigners have to pay higher fees for 
university. This is an obstacle for many young immigrants in Ireland where university fees are 
disproportionately high for non-EU immigrants compared to Irish citizens.  
Citizenship may be a condition for scholarships. This is the case, for example, in Spain and 
Germany where many of the financial resources that allow students to support their university 
studies are only available for citizens.  
Political Participation 
Only citizenship grants the right to vote in national elections in nearly all EU Member States. 
Voting may be a great incentive to naturalise for immigrants that want to become politically 
active, or even just feel that they should matter in politics. In many countries, citizenship is also 
required to hold an elected office (e.g. Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium) or join a political 
party (e.g. Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Estonia). 
National roundtable participants had varying opinions on the incentive of political participation.  
One reason to apply for Portuguese 
citizenship is gaining bargaining power to 
negotiate with the institutions, even private 
institutions, such as banks, entities giving 
credit, or when one has children. We were 
surprised by the issue of the financial credits 
because having the Portuguese citizenship 
really facilitates the access to the credit to 
purchase a set of goods.  
 (Civil Servant, Portugal) 
It was to try and get around the 
fees issue for third level 
(university), (…) like I say it was 
only 50 or so people I spoke to, but 
none of them said they wanted to 
become Irish for any kind of 
ephemeral reasons, it was entirely 
practical.  
 (NGO, Ireland) 
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Newcomers and especially vulnerable 
immigrants are often primarily concerned with 
settling in, finding a job and providing a future 
for their children. Immigrants from developing 
countries tend to be less politically active. Their 
level of activity tends to increase over time. 
Other roundtable participants highlight that 
political participation is the final step of 
becoming a full member of society.  
Surprisingly, citizenship and political 
participation was not discussed in terms of 
empowerment. Immigrants are not seen as 
important constituencies in many countries and 
few participants voiced the need for immigrants 
to naturalise in order to influence the policies 
that affect them. With a few exceptions, politicians at the national roundtables did not discuss 
immigrants as potential voters. The importance of the immigrant population has been 
recognised in recent elections in traditional countries of immigration (e.g. Canada and the US). 
But politicians in the EU generally have not woken up to the political relevance of immigrants.  
 
Administrative burden 
Citizenship can resolve much of the administrative burden imposed on foreigners. Foreigners 
have to renew their status at regular 
intervals. In many EU countries, 
immigrants have to meet demanding 
requirements to maintain a residence 
permit. They could become irregular 
immigrants if they lose their status. 
Immigrants’ treatment by immigration 
authorities can be seen as harassment or 
even discrimination. Acquiring 
citizenship may be a way to avoid regular 
visits to the local administration and the 
anxiety of the procedure and the 
When one wakes up every day without 
being able to pay rent or the mortgage. 
You can’t pay for your children’s 
studies. Or you can’t provide a better 
economic situation for your family than 
in the country that you left. Then 
political rights and so forth doesn’t 
have any importance, for those of us 
who came from other countries to start 
anew in this [country]. I’m saying this 
as an immigrant.  
 
 (Politician, Spain) 
Foreign citizens in Portugal have to have their 
documentation in order, permanently in order 
(…). The set of documents that he/she has to 
show for the renewal, then the effort of the 
renewal, it is a lot of trouble. After all this, it’s 
much easier if the migrant has Portuguese 
citizenship rather than going through the 
Calvary once in a while. 
            
 (NGO, Portugal) 
The fact is that we want access to citizenship simply to really feel like citizens, by being able to 
participate in a social democratic, economic process because we have provided the economic part 
but we do not have the social one. So, it's about wanting to be here ... People who get nationality 
get it not just to have peace of mind, they are people who want to stay.  
 (NGO, Spain) 
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requirements for renewal (e.g. maintaining employment or not residing outside the country for 
extended time periods). Even long queues for non-EU nationals at the airport can raise 
immigrants’ interest in naturalisation. 
 
Other practical reasons 
A few additional practical reasons for naturalisation were sometimes raised in the roundtables. 
Facilitated family reunification for nationals may be an incentive for the limited number of 
transnational families interested—but unable—to reunite under strict legislation for non-EU 
nationals. Non-EU nationals face more demanding requirements for family reunification, for 
example, in Germany and France. This incentive does not exist where the requirements for 
family reunification with third country nationals are equally inclusive for nationals and non-EU 
nationals (e.g. Portugal) or equally restrictive (e.g. Austria, Ireland, United Kingdom). This logic 
implies that in these countries family reunification would be a reason not to naturalise for EU 
citizens who enjoy a secure favourable right as foreigners under EU law.  
The decision of immigrants to naturalise may also be influenced by their rights and 
responsibilities in their country of origin. Another minor practical advantage of citizens is 
diplomatic protection abroad. Citizens can turn to any embassy (in many cases also EU 
representations) and demand support. Young people’s decision to naturalise may be influenced 
by whether or not this will exempt them from military service in their country of origin or 
residence.  In addition, naturalisation may decrease people’s rights in their country of origin. 
For example, many Turks in Germany can lose rights to property ownership and inheritance 
provisions unless they apply for a Turkish ‘blue card’ that grants these rights to former Turkish 
citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obtaining nationality is for most people like “phew”, being able to rest. It is [about] being able to 
get rid of the memory of a series of procedures and feeling of legal insecurity and dependence. 
About the feeling of ‘all the things I have to worry about’ 
               (Politician, Spain) 
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Head vs. Heart? 
If one believes neuroscientists ‘left-
brainers’ are more logical, analytical and 
objective, while a person who is ‘right-
brained’ is more intuitive and subjective. 
In short, ‘left-brainers’ think with their 
heads and ‘right brainers’ with their 
hearts. The national roundtables featured 
a lot of discussion on the question 
whether the ‘right-brain’ or ‘left-brain’ 
prevails in the decision to naturalise. This, 
of course, could not be answered 
conclusively. The roundtables suggest 
that, as with most decisions, this one too 
relies on both the ‘head and heart’.  
Expert participants at the roundtables generally preferred the ‘practical’ motivation of 
immigrants to naturalise over the ‘emotional’ motivation. It should be noted that the 
roundtables did not host immigrants themselves who went through the process, with the 
exception of the Irish roundtable. It may be that highly educated experts are less convinced that 
subjective drivers are relevant because they deal with citizenship at a different level of 
abstraction. The emphasis of practical advantages in favour of subjective reasons could be 
linked to an ‘expert bias’ – experts who are themselves ‘left brainers’. The national roundtable 
participants that argued that naturalisation is also a symbolic and emotional matter were 
usually representatives of NGOs, service providers or immigrants themselves.  
In general, the discussion about why immigrants naturalise reveals the limits of the current 
national debates on citizenship in the EU. The policy debate on citizenship focuses on laws and 
requirements. While legal obstacles definitely influence the naturalisation rate, favourable laws 
are only the starting point to encourage eligible immigrants to naturalise.  
 
The question is why should I naturalise? You can’t force these people to it. It’s not so much the 
citizenship of the heart and soul in Germany, singing the Nibelungen song and a certain level of 
loyalty in their heads. That’s dissolving a bit. You have to be realistic. We feel like Europeans (…) we 
find it really comfortable in Europe. Citizenship gives something to people who travel a lot and 
participate in so- called globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation. And then the 
question isn’t about feeling.   
                    (Citizenship Lawyer, Germany) 
From practice, I have to say that it occurs 
very seldom that someone really says in 
romantically embellished words ‘it is my 
heart’s desire to become Austrian’. In most 
cases - and also rightly - residence stability 
and the free access to the labour market, 
and for refugees, who are finally able to go 
on holiday or, let alone, visit their family in 
their home country. These are so to speak 
very vital reasons for striving to acquire the 
citizenship.   
(Civil Servant, Austria) 
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4.3 Public opinion and discourse: The (un) welcoming society 
 
The previous discussion on ‘why immigrants naturalise’ shows that numerous emotional and 
practical factors play a role. Roundtable participants across the EU were asked to discuss 
whether they think that society at large also has an impact. This section presents the results.  In 
theory, a ‘welcoming’ society can be conducive to a shared sense of belonging among 
immigrants. Immigrants may feel more encouraged to become citizens when the public 
discourse on immigration and citizenship is generally positive and inclusive towards 
immigrants.  A negative public debate can discourage immigrants from naturalising, even when 
there are many practical benefits and few legal or procedural obstacles.  
In public discourse, citizenship is often conflated 
with controlling immigration. According to the 
national roundtable participants in the UK, the 
immigration debate directly influences citizenship 
acquisition. Immigration has been framed as a 
security issue in the past. Currently, the 
government is pursuing a sharp reduction in 
overall immigration levels. The popular impression 
that ‘there are too many foreigners’ or ‘immigrants 
are security risks’ may affect how members of the public, immigrants, and authorities talk about 
naturalisation to each other. The media often portrays immigrants as ‘benefit abusing’ or ‘health 
care’ shoppers that are a burden on the public pocket. This has an impact on funding for 
language classes to support immigrants that want to become British citizens. UK stakeholders 
have also highlighted regional differences in the discourse on citizenship. For example, the 
debate on immigration is different in Scotland where migrant workers are needed.  
Estonia is one interesting example because it has a large Russian-speaking minority with many 
Russian citizens and stateless people. The discourse about the Russian-speaking minority is 
perceived to be negative. At times, the Russian-speaking minority is seen as ‘occupants’. This 
label leaves many ‘tired and insulted’ and further discourages them from naturalisation. 
They have been told that they 
don’t belong since the moment 
they were born.  
(NGO, Estonia) 
 
The better you actually know the Estonian language and the more you read the Estonian press, the 
more you feel alienated from this society. Because there is so much negativity towards the Russian 
population living here in Estonia and really it is a big barrier for people to gain the feeling of 
belonging to Estonia.             
(NGO, Estonia) 
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4.4 Politics: Who benefits from new citizens? 
 
Citizenship is often one of the most controversial topics in party politics. Defining legal 
membership of society through citizenship goes to the heart of the state. Defining what 
outsiders need to do to become citizens may or may not reflect what all citizens have in 
common. What makes someone a citizen? Citizenship, similar to immigration, incites emotional 
attitudes in the wider public. In addition, citizenship has the potential to shape the long-term 
future of a country by changing its population and electorate.  
The politicisation of citizenship policies can hinder states from passing needed reforms. Usually, 
a broad party consensus is needed to change something as fundamental as the regulation of 
citizenship status. Citizenship is a difficult terrain in which to manoeuvre in politics. Political 
parties are worried about unfavourable public opinion and are often divided along ideological 
lines. Even consensual wings of mainstream parties are reluctant to take on citizenship reform, 
because of a perceived potential pushback from sceptical or xenophobic voters. The media 
sensationalises citizenship to appeal to readers by framing immigration with an often negative 
bias. In addition, the public can easily be misinformed due to the technical complexity of 
citizenship policies.  
Stakeholders at the national roundtables were asked about the political environment regarding 
citizenship policies. Who are the main drivers in the debate? Which changes are feasible, which 
ones are unrealistic given the political dynamics?  
 
 
There are conflicting messages about citizenship acquisition and the meaning of being a British 
citizen. Under the Labour government, there was a real emphasis on the National Security 
discourse: becoming British was seen as a way not to become a terrorist, and British citizenship 
was there to establish a border between aliens and citizens. Under the Coalition government, the 
objective is to reduce migration rather than focusing on citizenship acquisition.  
(Citizenship Lawyer, UK) 
The general climate plays a role - whether people feel that they belong to Austria and want to 
make this known with this official step and, secondly, this plays a role among people who have 
already naturalised - certain people (of course, not everyone) tell me some time and again: ‘now I 
have possessed an Austrian passport for some years, but of which use is it to me, for I am still 
sometimes regarded or treated as a foreigner’. 
 (Academic expert, Austria) 
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The salience of citizenship as a political issue 
The first question regarding the politics of citizenship is whether the issue matters in the 
current political context. What place does citizenship have on the political agenda, who is 
interested, and why? The issue may (1) simply not be important at the moment, (2) discussed in 
connection with other societal issues (e.g. immigration) or (3) be at the centre of the political 
agenda. 
1. In some countries, such as Italy and 
Portugal, citizenship was not high on the 
agenda at the time of the national 
roundtables due to the financial crisis and 
budget austerity, the preparation of 
national elections (Italy), or because 
citizenship is generally ‘not a divisive issue 
in society’ (Portugal). The national 
roundtable participants in some countries 
stated that citizenship has the potential to 
climb the agenda, however, politicians are 
eager to contain the issue to avoid side-
lining more pressing issues (e.g. the 
financial crisis). In contrast, some parties 
use immigration and citizenship as a 
smokescreen to distract the public from 
intractable economic and social issues. 
 
 
2. Often the political debate may be devoted not necessarily to citizenship but to issues 
surrounding it. Frequently, other issues such as immigration and welfare politics are 
associated with citizenship in the public eye.  While citizenship is not a priority of the UK 
government at the moment, related priorities on settlement and the path to citizenship have 
a direct impact. In addition, the debt crisis has another indirect influence on citizenship. 
Cuts in language courses for immigrants will make meeting the language requirement more 
difficult for many. Cuts can also result in a reduction of staff which can delay the procedures. 
 
3. Citizenship can ascend to the top of political debates, mostly in periods leading up to 
national elections. This is currently the case in Germany.  Elections in 1998 gave rise to a 
very controversial debate around immigration and citizenship at the regional level in Hesse. 
Currently we have a situation in which any reform which is being made becomes an incendiary 
bomb in order to create smoke and to hide other things, to distract the public opinion from the 
reality of politics.   
 (NGO, Spain) 
Foreigners, immigration, have always 
been the scapegoats par excellence. 
Populism is the first that takes it. We 
have seen it in Greece, we are seeing it 
now and possibly it will infect the whole 
Europe. It was already there before the 
crisis, I mean, attacking immigration, 
blaming all economic problems on it. 
Before the crisis it was already daily 
bread, so now much more. And I think 
that if we unveil the heart of the matter, 
the possibility to modify now the 
nationality, the access requirements for 
the nationality, it is for sure that it will be 
worse (than before). 
  
(Citizenship lawyer, Spain) 
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We see a real fatigue among those who’ve worked on this issue for a while (…) you can also 
imagine how the energy transition or the end of the military service requirement, I mean the real 
hot potatoes, can be dealt with at some point. That means that it’s a major political project for 
society but I fear that we will come to the point with naturalisation law at some point and even 
with ius soli, that it isn’t a hot political issue between the big political blocs anymore.  
(Politician, Germany) 
In light of the upcoming federal elections in late 2013, citizenship and multiple nationality 
may reappear as a political issue. 
Some participants stated that reforms are generally more likely to be done in ‘calm waters’ 
when citizenship receives less media and public attention. Depending on the intended changes 
and political party dynamics, stakeholders may choose carefully to push the citizenship debate 
or to foster a technical consensus under the public radar. In light of anti-immigrant sentiment 
and right-wing parties in many EU countries, several NGO representatives and politicians stated 
that any new reform ‘would only be worse than the existing laws’ (e.g. Spain, Portugal, UK).  
 
 
The framing of citizenship as a political issue 
Citizenship is framed differently by politicians and the media. Stakeholders have reported that 
citizenship was long associated in public debate with security and welfare issues (e.g. Italy, UK).  
But there are also positive frames which can propel the citizenship debate. Such frames often 
refer to economic needs such as labour market shortages and the competition for ‘the best and 
brightest’ (e.g. Estonia, Germany). 
Depending on the frame, political parties 
anxious about public reactions can shy 
away from pushing for citizenship reform. 
The more citizenship is a divisive topic for 
the public, the more political capital has 
to be invested to promote changes.   
According to the perception of one 
Austrian stakeholder, politicians’ views 
on citizenship may even be framed as 
maintaining national sovereignty. When 
other policy areas are perceived as 
heavily influenced by EU legislation, 
I believe citizenship is misconceived in 
politics, because they think that the public 
opinion is afraid of high naturalisation rates 
and therefore they keep the naturalisation 
rates at such a low level. But I think that 
this (public opinion) is also influenced the 
other way around. Liberal politics can 
influence the attitude of the population. 
Politics would benefit if the two major 
parties would have some more courage.  
 
 (Academic expert, Austria) 
Citizenship law is the only law where we can still act with sovereignty, where there are no stupid 
guidelines from the bad EU and the bad EEC, where we can decide what we want and symbolic 
politics are made here as far as possible. 
(NGO, Austria) 
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citizenship is a unique area where Austria enjoys full competence. Thus, liberalisation of 
citizenship may be avoided because it could be perceived by wary voters as abiding to 
international pressures. 
 
How citizenship is framed in the debate can vary significantly in different parts in the country. 
UK participants reported great differences between Scotland and England. Scotland, in need of 
work migrants, is supporting language tuition and attempts to create a welcoming culture. 
Spanish participants alluded to territorial disparities in their country. Catalonia may embrace a 
more liberal view on citizenship primarily to oppose the central government (Civil servant, 
Spain).  Stakeholders in Germany referred to regional and local disparities in the application of 
naturalisation procedures. Some argued that low naturalisation rates can also be a result of 
more conservative local government which tightens its available screws to limit naturalisation.  
 
Negative citizenship frames resonate greatly among parts of the population that is misinformed 
and that feels a general unease about fast-increasing diversity and immigration in an ever more 
globalising world. The media can exacerbate the problem with undifferentiated reporting that 
increases prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes. Especially in times of economic difficulties 
and broader social issues, immigration and citizenship are sensitive issues vulnerable to 
politicisation. Participants in Portugal have stated that a positive consensus about immigration 
takes hard, long-term work with sectors across political, social and media sectors.  
 
 
Path dependency 
The principle of path dependency states that once a certain circumstance has been prolonged 
for a critical period of time, it is easier to maintain than to change it even though reforms might 
be more reasonable. Path dependency can also apply to discourse. According to some 
participants, once politicians across parties and the mainstream media have embraced a 
negative frame, it is much harder to challenge common assumptions. 
 
In some countries, the citizenship regime has not been substantially reformed in decades. Over 
the years, the legal provisions have grown complex to an extent where policy makers are 
hesitant to support reform because they are afraid of making the situation worse. For example, 
citizenship laws in Italy and Spain date back to a time when those countries were major 
countries of emigration. The transition to immigration countries has been too fast for legislation 
to adapt to the new situation. In contrast, Portugal adopted a comprehensive reform in 2006 
adapting to new realities. The complexity of the UK citizenship laws is partly based on the 
special ties to former colonies. Any reform at this point is perceived as too controversial.  
Until today when immigration is actually absent from the media field, it was a long road and it 
was because of indeed the work of many, many people.  
(Civil servant, Portugal) 
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Winning votes by punishing immigrants 
The political context of citizenship is shaped by 
the salience and frame of citizenship as an 
issue as previously discussed. Political parties 
play a crucial role in this process. Citizenship is 
subject to the power struggle between and 
inside party politics, just as it is for any other 
major political issue. The main question is who 
benefits and who loses by changing citizenship 
policies. Which party will win voters and which 
one will lose them? This question helps to 
further explain the political dynamics 
surrounding the issue of citizenship. 
 
 
In many countries, national roundtable 
participants stated that political parties 
often fail to make citizenship a priority not 
because they fundamentally disagree but 
because they are concerned about 
disappointing voters. This hesitance to 
take the first step makes it difficult for any 
political actor to position himself 
successfully. Left-wing parties are anxious 
about losing votes to the centre right and 
the centre right is concerned about giving 
votes to the far-right. Of course, the same dynamic works in reverse. Participants in Germany 
stated that the governing centre-right party (CDU) may embrace a reform of multiple nationality 
restrictions as a way to ‘steal’ a major issue traditionally brought forward by the social-
democratic party, the main competitor in the federal election.  
 
Politicians may run the risk of 
overestimating the opinion of the public. 
Participants in Estonia stated that the 
public generally has fewer reservations 
about a discussion about citizenship than 
the political parties.  Many stakeholders 
see the opportunity for citizenship reform 
when political parties agree on main points 
and reform is then promoted from the top-
down. Different political actors have to be 
assembled around the same issue often for 
different reasons. Centre-right parties are 
often more comfortable promoting 
citizenship as part of debates on labour market shortages and high-skilled immigration. Left- 
And the focus is set to grow on that because 
when you look at where the tectonic plates 
are shifting, labour sees it as a good way of 
getting votes off the conservative; you also 
have the UKIP party creeping in and so 
conservatives are watching their right flank, 
essentially it's a race to the bottom. 
 (NGO, UK) 
Mr. Kurz (state secretary for integration) 
positioned himself and has quasi total 
power to negotiate these modifications 
concerning the Citizenship Law 
amendment.  The SPÖ (social democrats) 
does not have any position in this game, 
thus he is criticized from the left side - 
the Green Party and he is criticized from 
the right side - the FPÖ and the other 
fractions which might exist. The SPÖ is 
unable to position itself, even though it 
would actually take the same position as 
Mr. Kurz. (…) There is in my opinion a 
standstill and no dynamics.  
  
(Academic expert, Austria) 
If I were an adviser to Ms. Merkel I’d say one 
easy way to take the wind out of the SPD’s sails 
would be to say: OK, let’s kill the optional rule, 
because it’s problematic from a technical 
standpoint, but also because it makes no 
sense, and then we can also show that we 
demand it and they haven’t implemented it 
anyway or whatever.  
  
(Politician, Germany) 
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wing parties can support citizenship reform in order to promote civil and economic rights.  
 
Winning votes by supporting immigrants 
It appears that the focus of political parties in the EU is to avoid losing votes over the issue of 
citizenship instead of gaining votes from immigrants. Immigrants already represent major 
constituencies in large EU cities. Citizenship is often discussed as a ‘favour for immigrants’ 
rather than an effort to gain votes from this growing share of the population. Large parts of the 
immigrant community are not eligible to vote, which poses a question about the 
representativeness of democracy. Remarkably, stakeholders rarely raised the issue democratic 
legitimacy in the context of the citizenship debate.  
Opposing citizenship reform may turn out to be counter-productive for mainstream parties. 
Many roundtable participants claimed an increasing need for political parties to engage 
immigrants, especially by referring to the US example where immigrants have proven decisive 
in electing the president. Reversely, in countries with smaller and more recent immigrant 
populations (e.g. Estonia, Ireland), immigrants themselves may be less appealing for politicians.  
Avoiding citizenship as an issue may not only be the result of overestimating negative attitudes 
of the public but also a result of misjudging voting patterns of immigrants. It is often believed 
that immigrants are more likely to vote for left parties because left parties generally promote 
more immigrant-friendly policies. However, this must not be true in all cases. 
 
Participants in several countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, and Spain) argued that the fear of the 
‘immigrant vote’ is unfounded.  Research indicates that immigrants also vote for conservative 
political parties. Some participants suggested that all mainstream parties could engage 
immigrants proactively rather than reacting to the immigrant vote when it is too late for them.   
I would say that if the parties wouldn’t govern in such a partisan way, with such an old-fashioned 
view that Turks vote SPD. We know many examples from the US, for example, that many 
Hispanics vote Republican because they have conservative values. In the future, you could see 
that in Germany, too.  
 (NGO, Germany) 
 [Politicians] are afraid of Russian citizens here in Estonia from one side, and on the other side they 
are afraid of a large number of Russians who might vote not as Estonian citizens would. Our politics 
consider all this and for now they believe it is better to leave the situation as is.’  
 (NGO, Estonia) 
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The role of civil society 
Because parties are too hesitant to act on citizenship reform based on fears over losing voter 
support, it is questionable whether citizenship has a lobby.  Who advocates for citizenship 
reform? Roundtable participants have expressed a lack of coordination on the side of civil 
society actors, including immigrant organisations, to coordinate and streamline interests (e.g. 
Germany, Spain). In most countries civil society is not strongly represented in this debate. Many 
NGOs, in particular service providers and immigrant NGOs, often do not have common positions 
on the issue of citizenship. The majority of invited experts to the national roundtables highly 
appreciated the opportunity to discuss citizenship policy and stated that there is a general lack 
of exchange and coordination between relevant actors. This means that key concerns may never 
enter the policy debate in many countries. NGO representatives and academic experts outlined 
potential actions civil society could take, such as drafting clear policy proposals or coordinating 
a joint media campaign. 
 
In many cases, the public is not sufficiently informed which makes a proliferation of subjective 
attitudes towards citizenship more likely. NGO representatives addressed the need for more 
evidence, which can be difficult to obtain, for example about the number of refusals and the 
reason for refusals of citizenship. 
 
We always tend to say that the left favours immigration, the right attacks it, I don't know, I think 
that we are in the 21st century where the left, the right and the centre, whatever, is more blurry. 
 (NGO, Spain) 
You have to get away from party politics, which would be very important at any rate, but really 
build a political coalition, a thematic alliance but also with others who work on this. There would 
have to be an alliance that combines knowledge, experiences, and visions and then creates a big 
campaign. I think, that we have come far enough that the majority is somewhat there, but due to 
partisan pressures and such it simply is not passed at the moment.  
 
 (NGO, Germany) 
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Participants highlighted the need for civil servants and local authorities to be more involved in 
policy making. These are the specialists providing the necessary knowledge and first-hand 
experience. Even when consulted, the view of implementing agencies and civil servants is often 
not taken into consideration sufficiently. In many countries, immigrant organisations are not 
well institutionalised and under-funded. Immigrant organisations often focus on service 
provision rather than representation of interests. Some of the national roundtables struggled to 
get migrant organisations at the table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who knows that we have at least 4 million people with multiple citizenship (even though it is not 
formally accepted)? For heaven’s sake, what is that? We have millions with multiple citizenship 
without it causing a problem for the state. Those with multiple citizenship have even reached the 
highest political offices. We need to feed the debate with the facts we already have. Over 50% of 
naturalisations are acquisition of multiple citizenship. The exception is the rule. And we have to 
transport all this and link it with our goals.  
 (Civil servant, Germany) 
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Annex  
I. Selected word frequencies in national roundtable discussions5 
Word frequencies indicate the main issues that were discussed at the roundtable in each country. 
Larger words were mentioned more often than smaller words.    
Austria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 All national roundtable transcripts were analysed according to the frequency of the use of selected words that 
correspond to the main research questions. Words that appeared more often are displayed in a larger fond. The 
search terms include: residence, income, dual citizenship (and multiple citizenship), ius soli, ius sanguinis, 
economic requirements, economic resources, civic knowledge, citizenship test (also ‘Life in the UK’ in the cas 
of the UK), criminal record, language, ancestry, cultural ties, refugees, stateless, discretion (and discretionary), 
fee (s), bureaucracy (and bureaucratic), transparency (and transparent), documentation (and documents), 
promotion, ceremonies (also ceremony), review, appeal, administration, public opinion, and discrimination. 
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France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland 
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Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 
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II. Background of the ACIT project 
The project ‘Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT)’ funded 
by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country-Nationals provides a new evidence 
base for comparing different elements of citizenship in Europe. 
The five consortium partners (the European University Institute, the Migration Policy Group, 
University College Dublin, University of Edinburgh and Maastricht University) have developed 
four sets of citizenship indicators on citizenship laws, their implementation, rates of citizenship 
acquisition and its impact on integration for the 27 EU Member States, accession candidates 
(Croatia, Iceland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey) and European Economic 
Area countries (Norway, Switzerland). The presentation of results from the citizenship indicator 
studies were complemented by national roundtables hosting key stakeholders in ten EU 
countries.  
The ACIT citizenship indicators are available online. All citizenship stakeholders including 
policymakers, academics, and non-governmental organisations among others, can go online and 
create their own graphs, dig into the data and use this information for presentations, debates or 
publications through an interactive online tool at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators.  
 
Related ACIT reports: 
 
Citizenship Law Indicators: 
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/eudo-citizenship-law-indicators  
 
Citizenship Implementation Indicators: 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/citimpindicators 
 
Citizenship Acquisition Indicators:  
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/citacqindicators 
 
Citizenship Integration Indicators:  
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/integration-indicators 
 
 
National Handbooks for all selected EU countries 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ 
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